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EVIDENCE
A.DMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY ILLEGAL SEARCH
AND SEIZURE
The recent Ohio case of State v. Lindway' again brings to the
front a question upon which courts have fluctuated from the time of
Boyd v. U. S.2 and upon which there is a diversity of opinion among
text and writers of law review articles. This question is that of the
admissibility of evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure.3
It was a generally recognized common law rule that any evidence
which is competent, material and relevant and which is not barred by
any special rule of evidence will be admissible and the courts will not
inquire into the manner in which the evidence was obtained.4 This rule
was first questioned in the Boyd case. Since that time, though with a
temporary change of heart in Zdams v. New York,5 the Supreme Court
of the United States has held that when evidence is obtained by an
illegal search and seizure, its use will be in violation of the fourth
amendment and it is therefore inadmissible.6 In some of its later opin-
ions the Supreme Court of the United States has held that the use of such
evidence is a violation of both the fourth and fifth amendments.7
The state courts have been greatly influenced by the United States
Supreme Court's decisions and by the popular prejudice against search
and seizure under the eighteenth amendment. In 1920 three states at
the most followed the Federal rule,' today there are eighteen states
2 131 Ohio St. 166, z N.E. (2d) z55, 5 Ohio Op. 538 (1936).
2 1 I6 U.S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (x886).
' For some general review of cases and the problem involved, see 23 Mich.
L. Rev. 748, 13 Minn. L. Rev. i, 24 A.L.R. 1408, 32 A.L.R. 4o8, 41
A.L.R. 1145, 52 A.L.R. 477, 88 A.L.R. 348, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 361.
4 Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 2183, Shields v. State, 104 Ala. 35, I6 So. 85
(i893); State v. Flynn, 36 N.H. 64 (1868); Commonwealth v. Dana, 2
Metc. (Mass.) 329 (1841); Cohn v. State, 12o Tenn. 6I, 109 S.W. 1149
(i9o8); Cluett v. Rosenthal, ioo Mich., 193, 58 N.W. oo9 (1894).
24 Sup. Ct. 372, 192 U.S. 585, 48 L. Ed. 575 (1904) affirming 176
N.Y. 351, 68 N.E. 636, 63 L.R.A. 406, 98 Am. St. Rep. 675 (1903).
'T Weeks v. U. S., 34 Sup. Ct. 341, 232 U.S. 383, 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914).7 Gouled v. U. S., 255 U.S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261 (1921); Amos v.
U. S., 255 U.S. 313, 41 Sup. Ct. z66 (1921); 25 Col. L. Rev. ii.
8 Mich., People v. Marxhausen (i919) 204 Mich. 559; 171 N.W. 557
Ky., Youman v. Commonwealth (I92O) 189 Ky. 152, 224 S.W. 86o, 13
A.L.R. 1303; Vermont, perhaps. See State v. Slaymon, 73 Vt. ziz, 62 Ad.
37 (igoi). However, the recent case of State v. Story (1932) 104 Vt. 379,
16o Atl. 257, reargument denied 104 Vt. 411, 16o At. 747 says State v.
Suiter (i9o6) 78 Vt. 391, 63 Ad. i82, and State v. Barr (905) 78 Vt.
97, 6z Ad. 93, had the effect of over-ruling State v. Slaymon, supra, 52
A.L.R. 477 states that only six states originally followed the Federal rule.
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following this rule.9 Twenty-seven states follow the common law rule
of admissibility.'0 Maryland is difficult to classify." In Rhode Island
9 Florida, Atz v. Andrews (192z) 84 Fla. 43, 94 So. 329; Idaho, State v.
Arregui (1927) 44 Ida. 43, 254 Pac. 788; Illinois, People v. Castree (1924)
311 Ill. 392, 143 N.E. IIZ; Indiana, Callendar v. State (1922) 136 N.E.
io, rehearing (1923) 193 Ind. 91, 138 N.E. 817; Ky., Youmant v. Com-
monwealth. (1920) 189 Ky. 152, 224 S.W. 86o, 13 A.L.R. 1303; Michi-
gan, People v. Mitroff (1925) 231 Mich. 661, 204 N.W. 726; Mississippi,
Williams v. State (1922) 129 Miss. 469, 92 So. 584. This state held a
statute, Miss. Law C. 244 par. 3, abolishing the federal rule and adopting the
orthodox rule in liquor cases as unconstitutional in Orick v. State, 140 Miss.
184, 105 So. 465 (1925); Missouri, State v. Owens (1924) 302 MO. 348,
259 S.W. IOO; Montana, State ex rel. King v. Dist. Ct. (1924) 70 Mont.
191, 224 Pac. 862; Oklahoma, Gore v. State (923) 24 Okla. Crim. Rep.
394, 218 Pac. 545; Oregon, State v. McDaniel (1925) 231 Pac. 965, affirmed
(1925) 115 Oreg. 187, 237 Pac. 373; South Dakota, State v. Gooder (i93i)
57 S. D. 619, 234 N.W. 61o; Tennessee, Hampton v. State (1923) 148
Tenn. 155, 252 S.W. 1007; Texas, this state after many years of following
the orthodox rule, by statute, Sec. I, c. 49, Acts of 3 9th leg. (1925), Article
727A, Tex. Code Crim. adopted the Federal rule which was followed in
Odenthal v. State (Tex. Crim. App. 1927) 290 S.W. 743; see 5 Tex. L.R.
424 (1927); Washington, State v. Buckley (1927) 145 Wash. 87, 258 Pac.
1030; West Virginia, State v. Wills (I922) 91 W. Va. 659, 114 S.E. 261;
Wisconsin, Hoyer v. State (1923) 18o Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89, 27 A.L.R.
73; Wyoming, Wiggin. v. State (1922) 28 Wyo. 480, 2o6 Pac. 373-
'"Alabama, Shields v. State (1893) 104 Ala. 35, 16 So. 85, 53 Am. St.
Rep. 17, 9 Am. Crim. Rep. 149; Arkansas, Starchman v. State (1896) 6z
Ark. 538, 36 S.W. 940; California, People v. Mayen (1922) 188 Cal. 237,
205 Pac. 435; Colorado, Roberts v. People (1926) 78 Colo. 555, 243 Pac.
544; Connecticut, State v. Reynolds (1924) ioi Conn. 224, 195 Ad. 636;
Delaware, State v. Chuchola (1922) 32 Dela. 133, 12o Ad. 212. This was a
case of contraband; Georgia, Williams v. State (1897) OO Ga. 511, 28 S.E.
624, 39 L.R.A. 269. Originally Georgia had the theory that evidence taken
from illegal search of person was inadmissible. Wright v. State (1911), 9 Ga.
App. 266, 70 S.E. 1126. This was overruled by Calhoun v. State (1916)
144 Ga. 679, 87 S.E. 893; Iowa, State v. Lozier (1925) 200 Ia. 652, 204
N.W. 256; Kansas, State v. Miller (I9OI) 63 Kans. 62, 64 Pac. 1033;
Louisiana, State v. Zeblit (1922) 152 La. 594, 93 So. 912; Maine, State v.
Plankett (874.) 64 Me. 534; Maassachusetts, Commonwealth v. Mercier, 257
Mass. 353, 153 N.E. 834; Minnesota, State v. Hoyle (19o6) 98 Minn.
254, 107 N. W. 1130; Nebraska, Billings v. State (1923) 191 N.W. 721,
1O9 Neb. 596; Nevada, State v. Chin Gin (1924) 47 Nev. 431, 224 Pac.
798; New Hampshire, State v. Ogelus (1919) 79 N.H. 241, 107 At. 314;
New Jersey, State v. Gould (1923) 99 N.J.L. 17, 122 At1. 596; New Mex-
ico, State v. Dillon (1929) 34 N.M. 366, 281 Pac. 474; New York, People
v. Defore (1926) 242 N.Y. 13, 15o N.E. 585; North Carolina, State v.
Wallace (1913) 162 N.C. 622, 78 S.E. I, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 423; North
Dakota, State v. Lacy (1927) 55 N.D. 83, 212 N.W. 442; Ohio, State v.
Lindway, 131 Ohio St. 166, 2 N.E. (2d) 255; Pennsylvania, Common-
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and Arizona the question remains open." A slight turning back toward
the orthodox view is seen in the recent Ohio case" and in Vermont's
definite stand."4 Even the Federal Court in Olmstead v. United States"
has put a definite limit on its doctrine by stating that the only evidence
obtained by illegal methods that will be inadmissible is that obtained in
violation of a constitutional provision and not that obtained in violation
of a state statute. The Federal doctrine is also limited by the rule that
there must be a motion to suppress the evidence before trial or the evi-
dence will be admissible.'" Not all the states following the Federal rule
apply this doctrine.'" A further limitation on the Federal rule is that
only evidence obtained illegally by Federal officers will be barred, not
that obtained by state officers or private persons." Since the state con-
wealth v. Dabbierio (1927) 29o Pa. St. 174. 138 Atl. 679. It is not certain
that Pennsylvania should be placed in this class. This case merely said the
use of evidence illegally obtained did not violate the self-incrimination clause
of the Pennsylvania Constitution. It left the point undecided as to whether
use of such evidence violated the illegal search and seizure clause; South Caro-
lina, State v. Campbell (1925) 131 S.C. 357, 127 S.E. 439; Utah, State
v. Aime (1923) 6z Utah 476, z2o Pac. 704; Vermont, State v. StacY (1932)
104 Vt. 379, i6o Ad. 257, reargument denied, 104 Vt. 411, 16o Adt. 747-
"
1The reason for this is that in I929, Maryland passed a law adopting
the federal rule as to misdemeanors, Sec. 4 A of Art. 35 of code, Ch. 194 Pub.
Gen. Laws of Maryland (i929) ; Gorman v. State (1932) 161 Md. 700, 158
Ad. 903 applies this statute in a misdemeanor case. However in Zukowski v.
State (1934) 175 Ad. 595 the court said in the absence of statute they would
apply the orthodox view of admissibility.
1" The nearest cases are State v. Chester (1925) 46 R. I. 485, 129 Atl.
596, and Adkins v. State, z8 Pac. (2d) 612, 4z Ariz. 534 (I934). In both
of these cases the searches were held lawful.
13 See note io, supra.
14 See note 8, supra.
25 277 U. S. 438, 48 Sup. Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928). No case has
been found dealing with the violation of a national statute distinct from the
constitution.
'' See note 6, supra. However in certain exceptional cases as where de-
fendant did not know that illegally obtained evidence was to be used against
him, such a motion was held unnecessary; Amos v. U. S., 255 U.S. 313, 41
Sup. Ct. 266, 65 L. Ed. 654 (1920); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S.
298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261, 65 L. Ed. 647 (1926).
17 Griffin v. Commonwealth (I9z5) 2o9 Ky. 143, 272 S.W. 403; Kit-
lein v. State (1925) Okla. Crim. Rep. .. ,, 235 Pac. 625. As to necessity of
such a motive see i U. of Chi. L. Rev. I zo.
"I Bordeau v. McDonald, 256 U.S. 465, 41 Sup. Ct. 574, 65 L. Ed.
1054 (1926). However if state officers obtain such evidence at request of
federal officers so that they are in reality agents of federal officers such evi-
dence will be barred. Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 31o, 48 Sup. Ct.
137 (1927). See note in 8 Boston U. L. Rev. 139, 16 Cal. L. Rev. 246, 28
Cal. L. Rev. 511, 23 Ill. L. Rev. 78, 12 Minn. L. Rev. 424, 6 Tex. L. Rev.
390, 37 Yale L. J. 784.
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stitutional limits do not apply to Federal officers, it seems that evidence
obtained illegally by Federal officers is admissible in state courts."
Another limitation is that it must be a violation of defendant's constitu-
tional rights, not a third party's. That is, evidence illegally taken from
A can be used against B.2" Further an interest in either the property
seized or property searched is required.
21
' 22
The question of admissibility of illegally obtained evidence has been
the subject of a diversity of both opinion and theory in the State of Ohio.
The first Supreme Court case of any significance was Ciano v. State.2"
This indicates that evidence is admissible though illegally obtained
where there is no objection until trial. However, the court seems to say
that if evidence were illegally taken and a motion to suppress such evi-
dence was made before trial, the motion would be granted and the evi-
dence would be inadmissible. The next cases were those of Rosanshi v.
State24 and Sabo v. State.25 They held that if a residence is not a bona
fide dwelling, contraband taken by illegal seizure may be admitted in
evidence regardless of a motion to suppress. These cases have caused
some writers to classify Ohio as taking a middle ground on this question,
viz; the contraband theory.2" The contraband theory as such has re-
ceived little support elsewhere nor does it seem to be relied upon in later
Ohio cases. In Porello v. State,2" the court, though holding the search
lawful, said, "While there is some conflict in the question of returning
evidence secured by a search without the issue of a warrant, the courts of
twenty-eight states, including Ohio, hold that such evidence is admis-
sible." Then in Nicholas v. Cleveland28 and Browning v. Clevelandr'
the court held non-contraband property seized by illegal search to be
11 Walters v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. I8Z, 250 S.W. 839 (1923). This
case declared that the evidence to be admissible must be procured under a valid
federal warrant though such warrant was invalid in the state.
"
0Holt v. United States, 42 Fed. (2d) 103 (C.C.A. 6th 1930); Kelly
v. United States, 6I Fed. (2d) 843 (C.C.A. 8th 1932) ; State v. Laundy, 103
Oreg. 443, 498, 204 Pac. 958, 2o6 Pac. 290 (1922); 17 Minn. L.Rev. 561
(1933).
1 Alvau v. United States (C.C.A. 9 th 1929), 33 Fed. (2d) 467. See 17
Minn. L.Rev. 551 as to amount of interest required.
22 For material on the limitations and ramifications on the federal doc-
trine and for review of the federal cases see 34 Harv. L.Rev. 673, 694, 7
Minn. L.Rev. 152, 36 Yale L.J. 536.
23 105 Ohio St. 229, 137 N.E. iX (1922).
24 io6 Ohio St. 442, 14o N.E. 370 (1922).
25 'O8 Ohio St. 200, 14o N.E. 499 (1923).
21 See Law Rev. Art. cited in note 3, supra.
27 121 Ohio St. 28o, 168 N.E. 135 (1929).
28 125 Ohio St. 474, 182 N.E. 26 (1932).
29 126 Ohio St. 285 (1933).
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inadmissible when there was a motion to suppress the evidence before
trial. Lastly, in the recent case of State v. Lindway3" the court de-
liberately took the view that all evidence, contraband or non-contraband,
is admissible though obtained by illegal search and seizure.
It is quite understandable that there should be this diversity of
opinion both among the states and in one particular state for there is
much to be said on both sides of this question. The decision must rest
upon what is the best public policy. Are we going to let officers of the
law have an unlimited freedom subject only to the action of trespass
against them if they violate the constitutional provisions of unreasonable
search and seizure? Or, are we, in order to prevent any interference
with such constitutional guarantee, going to throw aside convicting evi-
dence and let obvious criminals go free because an officer has blundered?
There is nothing conclusive in the rationalization of either of these
views, though the argument in favor of admitting such evidence seems
to be somewhat stronger.
Those who favor the Federal rule claim that if such evidence is
received by the courts, the fourth amendment will be practically nulli-
fied, since the admission of such evidence will encourage officers of the
law to violate the homes of our citizens without reasonable suspicion,
thus leaving our citizens subject to an autocratic official body that knows
no limits.3" They add that the action of trespass against the officer is
not adequate.32 Therefore to uphold the fourth amendment such evi-
dence will not be received. Furthermore those maintaining this view
say that the admission of such evidence is also a violation of the fifth
amendment against self incrimination." The defendant could not be
compelled to testify as to such evidence or produce such evidence by a
duces tecum because it would be self-incriminating and so if the evi-
dence is illegally taken it amounts to self-incrimination. Writers main-
tain that the fourth and fifth amendments overlap if not in history at
least in spirit.3"
On the other hand courts which uphold the common law or ortho-
dox view of admitting such evidence and which are supported by the
writings of WVigmore3" take the practical view that the fourth amend-
ment says nothing about evidence, that it is merely a check on the legis-
30 See note I, supra.
-" See any of the cases in note 9, supra; 8 Am. Bar. Ass. J. 646, Z2 Ky.
L.J. 63, 6z Cent. L.J. 392, 25 Col. L. Rev. II, 3 Oreg. L. Rev. 323.
32 Law Rev. Art. materials in note 32, supra, and 13 Minn. L.Rev. i,
15; 43 Yale L.J. 897.
33 See note 7, supra, and note 34, infra.
34 z5 Col. L. Rev. I I, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 361.
35 4 Wigmore, Evidence Sec. 2183, 8 Am. Bar Assn. J. 479-
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lature so that that body may never declare an illegal official invasion
of private rights not to be a trespass.38 Wigmore and others demon-
strate that the fourth and fifth amendments arose at entirely different
times and in no way overlap." The fifth amendment only applies to
testimony by compulsion of legal process. "Witness" is the keyword of
this amendment." It does not say evidence will not be admissible
because it is incriminating or if it is taken from the defendant but only
if defendant is forced to say or do something by way of testimonial com-
pulsion. 9 They point out that the motion to suppress rule of the federal
court does not do away with a collateral issue because it is collateral no
matter when presented and that if such evidence is inadmissible as in
violation of the Constitution at one time, it should be at all times. °
Constitutional rights are not lost by failure to object at a proper time.
This view concludes with the practical argument that it is no way to
aid society by letting both the criminal and trespassing officer go. In-
stead both should be punished.41 There is the civil remedy of trespass
against the invading officer.4"
In the case of State v. Lindway3 the officers found in their illegal
search two shotguns, three revolvers, and a rifle, some loaded, some not.
They also found a quantity of all sorts of ammunition, a tear gas pistol,
and two completed bombs having a nitroglycerine content of 23%.
Here was a veritable arsenal. In such a situation few people would
think that the accused should escape because the officers have erred.
Society is united in condemning the acts of the accused. There is no
feeling that the offense is a minor one or that there is no moral wrong.
With the repeal of the eighteenth amendment and with future cases
more likely to be those involving offenses almost universally condemned,
it seems likely that the stronger sentiment will favor admissibility of
such evidence. So it is not unlikely that many state courts which once
held the evidence admissible will return to their former position. The
principal case presents a sound and healthy attitude.
JUSTIN H. FOLKERTH.
36 i9 111. L. Rev. 303.
.1 See notes 36 and 37, supra, 31 Yale L.J. 5 18, 8 Corn. L. Quart. 76.
38 Cardozo, J., in People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 27 (i926) quoting
from Baker, J., in Haywood v. United States, z66 Fed. 795, 8o2 (1920).
s9 4 Wigmore Evidence, Secs. 2263, 2264.
40 See note 36, supra.
41 See note 36, supra.
42 19 111. L. Rev. 303, 8 Corn. L. Quart. 76. The American Guaranty
Co. v. McNiece, et. al. (1924); 1i Ohio St. 532, 146 N.E. 77-
43 See note i, supra.
